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SI \IT; H i I I I 'AH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WADt II I S 
Vfniil i i i it Appellant 
Case No, 20020703-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
J ( j R 1 S D 1 C T I O N AND N A T | J R E U F , r H E P R 0 C E E D I N G S 
to "possess" a firearm, despite the clear mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503, which 
prohibits the possession,, or use of a firearm by a restricted person. 
•
 I S S U E PRESENTED Q N AFPfcAl AM) M ANDARDS OF REV IEW 
Issue: Whether Utah Code Ann. $ /U-IU-JU^ . ?ohibiting the possession c i i is 3 : f 
a firearm by a restricted person, accords with article .. M- . - the Utah Constitution, which 
allow s the I huh Legislature to restrict the. "lawful . 
.rearms. 
Standard of Review (>ii a M nl nt < n t i n u i i ilhiih i i iiiiiil i imnis . flu* ilt i isnui ill iillln 
court of appeals, not the district court, and applies the same standard of review used by 
'the court of appeals, Clark \> Clark, 2001 UT 44,«! * ^ P Id 538, 540, A trial court's 
»s I wis n,l ( in ,i Il ,11 i n III i .ill ft itic nal is 
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i 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, f 18, 993 P.2d 854. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
i 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 6 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for the other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from 
defining the lawful use of arms. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (1999) ! 
A Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses or has under his custody or control... any 
firearm is guilty of a third degree felony . . . 
i 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a) (1999) 
A Category I restricted person is a person who... is on 
probation or parole for any felony . . . 
I 
The complete text of these provisions is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on August 15, 2000, with possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503(2)(a), and theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 
and 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii) (1999). R. 2. He was bound over for trial following a preliminary 
hearing on October 4,2000. R. 18. 
On January 4,2001, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503 is unconstitutional because it violated the right to bear arms guaranteed 
2 
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by article I, § 6 of the I Jtah Constitution. R. 45, 124. The trial court denied the motion, 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 against a claim that it v iolated article I, § 6. R. 141-43. A copy 
of the trial court's Ruling and Ordei I ited February 6, 2001, is attached as Addendum B. 
A copy of S tate v I ; i is attached u.. laendumC. 
Defend 
condition that he be allowed to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. R. 164-71. 1le 
was sentenced to 180 days in the Utah County I ail, although he was eligible for work 
release afln "lllil ,l,r, y „iii„,l Mipnu'.ril iiirh.ilini ln,«r '" • ninilli1. I!"  IXP-H,.',. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 184. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's 
conviction .on July 5, 2002 See State t Willis, 2002 I IT App 229, 52 P.3d 46, a cop> of 
this Court on September 3, 2002. On January 24, 2003, this Coi in: Il: g i anted the petiti :)rt 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As a COD,,. \ icted felon, defendant knew he was prohibited from possessing a gun. D 
190* Ji ("in! Ill) ill i iMsni i ln j 1.11- liiii'd ||iii("''('ill I \ v|)liiin IlIii i f i irsHici mil llhi1 N milhi i i i mini 
handgun in his bedrooni t; lose! \< 191; 15 - i0. At first, he stated that the handgun had 
been given to him by his brother-in-law's mother,, who asked defendant to store it in his 
lu ' i l in i i in 1" I'M V I ulli1! i l r l cmlan l i, l i in i i i i l Ihr iiiiii In,nil h m i JJIKTII II Iliiiii JI » '. ' ' • 
collateral for a loan. R. 190:2. 
3 
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I 
However, his brother-in-law, Jonathan Coones, told a different story. In late July 
2000, Coones reported to police that the handgun had been stolen from his motor home. 
R. 191:6. Coones knew defendant had seen the weapon and had access to the motor 
home, so he asked defendant whether he had "borrowed" the gun. R. 191:7. Defendant 
stated that he had not. Id. 
On August 1, 2000, Eric Price, the Adult Probation and Parole Officer assigned to 
monitor defendant, received a phone call from Officer Brad Mitchell of the Spanish Fork | 
Police Department. R. 191:14-15, 18, 20. Officer Price conducted a search of 
defendant's residence and discovered the 9-millimeter handgun. R. 191:15. Officer 
I 
Mitchell arrived soon thereafter and confirmed that the serial number on the recovered 
handgun matched that of the gun Coones reported stolen. R. 191:21. 
ARGUMENT A 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
ARTICLE I, § 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION DOES NOT 
PROTECT THE RIGHT OF A CONVICTED FELON TO 
"POSSESS" A FIREARM. * 
Defendant continues to claim that the Utah Constitution guarantees him the right to 
"possess" a firearm, even though he is a convicted felon. Aplt. Br. at 6. Thus, he argues -
that he cannot be convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2), which provides 
that "a Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
4 
under his custody or control... any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony 
Defendant is a "Category I" restrict person because he was on parole for evading a police 
I 
• 4 • • 
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officer, a third-degree felony, at the time of his arrest on August 1, 20001. R. 191:15. 
This argument contradicts clear precedent, runs counter to legislative history and defies 
common sense. 
In analyzing the constitutionality of a statute, "we construe the legislation, to the 
extent possible, as being in compliance with the federal and state constitutions." State v. 
Herrera, 1999 UT 64,1J 18, 993 P.2d 854. Moreover, "[w]hen reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute, we must presume that the statute is constitutional." State v. 
Krueger, 975 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah App. 1999). "We resolve any reasonable doubts 
concerning legislation in favor of constitutionality." Id. "A facial challenge to a 
legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would 
be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). A facial challenge 
succeeds only when the statute at issue is incapable of any valid application. State v. 
Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, % 78, 20 P.3d 342. Thus, a single valid application of the statute is 
sufficient to defeat a facial challenge. Because the statute is clearly valid as applied to 
defendant, his facial challenge must fail. See Herrera, 1999 UT at % 50 (facial challenge 
fails if challenged statute is valid as applied to defendant). 
1
 This conviction was only one of numerous offenses committed by defendant as a 
juvenile and as an adult between November 1997 and February 2001. See Adult 
Probation and Parole Presentence Investigation Report, dated May 5, 2001. R. 190:3-9. 
5 
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The crux of defendant's argument is that 1984 amendments to article I, § 6 of the 
Utah Constitution limited the Legislature's power to regulate firearms. Before the 1984 
amendments, the provision stated: 
The people have the right to bear arms for their security and 
defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this 
right by law. 
In its current version, as amended in 1984, the provision reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from 
defining the lawful use of arms. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 6 (emphasis added). Defendant contends that the amended provision 
allows the Utah Legislature to restrict the "use" of a firearm, but prohibits the enactment 
of any statute that in any way limits the individual right to "possess" a firearm. Aplt. Br. 
at 10-11. Thus, in defendant's view, convicted felons like himself have the constitutional 
right to "possess" guns so long as they do not "use" them. 
This contention cannot be seriously entertained. As demonstrated below, 
defendant's argument is not supported by any logical reading of article I, § 6 or by the 
legislative history of the provision. 
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Rejected Defendant's 
Claim that Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution Grants a 
Convicted Felon the Right to Possess Firearms. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss after 
determining that State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500, disposed of his claim that 
6 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 was unconstitutional. Defendant does not challenge In, but 
rather argues that it is distinguishable because that case dealt with the actual use of a 
firearm as opposed to mere possession. Aplt. Br. at 7. Defendant is mistaken. In dealt 
with precisely the same issue - a convicted felon charged with possession of a firearm. 
In involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm from a 
vehicle. 2000 UT App at f 2. One week later, defendant was involved in another 
"shootout". Id. During an investigation, defendant admitted he was in possession of a 
handgun. Id. The defendant was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503. Id. On appeal, the 
defendant claimed the statute was an unconstitutional restriction of his right to bear arms. 
Id. at ^  3. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, noting that "[t]his statute only 
restricts that right [to bear arms] under very limited circumstances - such as a felony 
indictment or conviction." Id. at f 14. Thus, the court upheld the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 against a challenge by a convicted felon charged with possession 
of a firearm - exactly the same challenge now made by defendant. Although the In 
defendant did not explicitly argue the use/possession distinction, In is still directly on 
point because it stands for the proposition that a convicted felon has no right to possess a 
firearm under article I, § 6. This holding is obviously applicable to defendant. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, relying on In, correctly ruled that defendant's 
challenge to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 was without merit. See 
Willis, 2002 UT App 229 at U 3. 
.- 7 . 
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i 
B. The Plain Meaning of Article I, §6 Demonstrates 
Legislative Intent to Restrict the Use of Weapons by 
Convicted Felons. 
The Court of Appeals properly rejected defendant's claim that the Utah 
Constitution protects his right to possess firearms by relying on the analysis of precisely 
the same argument raised by the defendant in In. Nonetheless, even without relying on 
In, defendant's claim is readily shown to be untenable. 
Defendant contends that the plain meaning of article I, § 6 supports his argument | 
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is unconstitutional. Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant 
correctly notes that a court, in considering the constitutionality of a statute, "'must begin 
its analysis with the plain language of the provision....'" Id. (citing Utah School Boards 
Ass 'n v. Utah State Bd. of Education, 2001 UT 2, If 13, 17 P.3d 1125). Defendant errs, 
however, in suggesting that a plain reading of article I, § 6 supports his strained * 
interpretation. On the contrary, defendant's interpretation relies on a hyper-technical and 
overly restrictive reading of the constitutional provision's final clause, which states 
"nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms." Utah 
Const, art. I, § 6 (emphasis added). Defendant's argument limits "use" of a gun to the 
active employment of the weapon, e.g., firing it, brandishing it or using it in the 
commission of a crime. "Possession," on the other hand, is presumably passive -
carrying, storing, perhaps even handling - anything that is not actively "using" the j 
weapon. 
8 
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However, the amended language of article I, § 6 need not be defined so narrowly. 
Under the plain ordinary understanding of the words, "use" and "possession" are not 
mutually exclusive terms; in fact, they are inextricably linked. See Black's Law 
Dictionary 1183 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "possession" as "the continuing exercise of a 
claim to the exclusive use of a material object"); cf. U.S. v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1153 
(7th Cir. 2001) ("[U]se of a drug implies its possession"). And while the distinction 
between active "use" and mere "possession" is clearly cognizable for some purposes - the 
gun collector, for example, could be said to merely "possess" weapons without "using" 
them - such "possession" can be as readily characterized as a kind of "use" - a passive 
use, but a "use" nonetheless.2 Nothing compels the artificially narrow construction urged 
by defendant. 
Thus, defendant's claim that the Willis Court rendered the term "possess" 
inoperative in Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503 is incorrect. See Aplt. Br. at 8. Because 
statutes are required to narrowly define the range of regulated conduct, specificity is 
required. Seef e.g., In, 2000 UT App 358, f 13 (Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503 not subject 
to arbitrary enforcement because it is narrowly drawn). By contrast, "[s]tate constitutions 
embody fundamental values and articulate the citizens' common aspirations for 
constitutional governance and the rule of law. Rather than stating inflexible specific rules 
2
 The Court of Appeals illustrated the folly of defendant's hypertechnical 
interpretation by noting that "the United States, by mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, 
theoretically "uses" that arsenal to deter would-be aggressors from taking military action 
against it." State v. Willis, 2002 UT App 229, 52 P.3d 46, n.3. 
9 
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4 
of conduct, they contain broad principles capable of accommodating societal changes." 
Martin v. Beer Board, 908 S.W.2d 941, 946-47 (Tenn. App. 1995). In short, the broadly 
drafted language of art. I, § 6 is entirely consistent with the necessarily more exacting 
provisions of Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503. 
Moreover, there are sound reasons to prefer a broader reading of article I, § 6. 
First, a broader reading avoids invalidating Utah Code Ann § 76-10-503, which would 
accord with the principle of construction that favors a constitutional interpretation I 
whenever possible. See, e.g., Herrera, 1999 UT at U 18 (reasonable doubts resolved in 
favor of constitutionality); Krueger, 975 P.2d at 495 (statutes are presumed 
4 
constitutional). 
Second, a broader interpretation avoids the absurd and contradictory results that 
necessarily follow from the narrow reading urged by defendant. As this Court has stated: 4 
"[W]e interpret a statute to avoid absurd consequences." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ^ 
12, 992 P.2d 986; see also U.S. v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27 (1948) ("No rule of 
4 
construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd 
consequences"); In re Overland Park Fin. Corp., 236 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001) 
("[C]ourts will reject an interpretation of a statute that produces an absurd result"). Under * 
defendant's view, criminal background checks required for the purchase of a gun would 
be useless against the felon who represents that he wishes merely to "possess" a weapon, 
but not "use" it. Similarly, any restrictions on concealed weapons would likely be 
unenforceable given that carrying a concealed weapon could be deemed mere 
I 
10 
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"possession." Metal detectors at courthouses, government offices and airports would be 
pointless if citizens had the unencumbered right to "possess" firearms. Perhaps even 
prison inmates could claim a right to possess guns. In short, a would-be gunman could 
not be legally penalized or even confronted until he actually began to "use" the gun, by 
which point the damage would be done. 
Obviously, Utah lawmakers could not have intended such bizarre consequences. 
Moreover, nothing in the text of article I, § 6 requires such an interpretation. 
Accordingly, defendant's claim that he cannot be penalized for possessing a handgun is 
unpersuasive, to say the least. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly rejected defendant's 
claims. 
C. The 1984 Amendment to Article I, §6 Did Not Give 
Convicted Felons the Right to "Possess" Firearms. 
As shown above, the plain language of article I, § 6 does not support defendant's 
position. His argument should be rejected for the reasons given above. Nonetheless, to 
further illustrate defendant's mistaken reading of the provision, a review of the history of 
the provision, both the original and amended versions, is helpful. 
During the 1983 and 1984 sessions of the Utah Legislature, lawmakers considered 
amendments to article I, § 6 which would explicitly state that the provision protected the 
rights of individual gun owners, not merely the collective right of a state "militia." See 
House Debate on Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, dated March 7, 1983. R. 84-94. Their 
concern was based on decisions by the Utah Supreme Court and elsewhere recognizing 
11 
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that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected only the collective right to 
bear arms. Id.; see also State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah 1982) ("Since the Second . 
Amendment right 'to keep and bear Arms' applies only to the right of the State to 
maintain a militia and not to the individual's right to bear arms, there can be no serious 
claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm"). 
Representatives also wanted to make sure that any amendment to article I, § 6 did 
nothing to restrict the traditional ability of the state to regulate the use of firearms, i 
particularly with regard to convicted felons. R. 87. This concern is clear in the following 
colloquy between the House speaker and the amendment's House sponsor: 
I 
MR. SPEAKER: Would this [the 1983 amendment] preclude 
registration of handguns and Saturday night specials? 
REP. HARRISON: Well, I hope, hopefully it wouldn't. My 
authority over here tells me "no way." Okay, as he points out, this does not 
specifically address registration. It simply gives us our right to bear arms ' 
for the specific things that are addressed in here. And it doesn 't preclude 
legislation concerning concealed weapons or felons or any prohibitive 
person from being, those rights being taken away from. 
MR. SPEAKER: Would it be permissible for the Legislature, after
 | 
passage of this constitutional amendment, to then require registration of 
Saturday night specials? 
REP. HARRISON: He says, "Yes, if they wanted to." It was 
permitted. 
MR. SPEAKER: Assuming that the person acquiring the Saturday I 
night special was a law-abiding citizen and had not been convicted of a 
prior felony, could the Legislature prevent his acquisition of a Saturday 
night special or any handguns? 
REP. HARRISON: If they wanted to. 
< 
R. 86-87. This version of the bill passed the House, but apparently was not approved by 
the Senate. R. 78, 84. 
i 
12 
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The following year, lawmakers again considered amendments and finally agreed 
on the current version of article I, § 6, which was approved by voters in the November 
1984 general election. Once again, lawmakers made it clear that the intent of the 
amendment was to protect the rights of individual gun owners without affecting the 
traditional ability of lawmakers to restrict the availability of weapons to certain classes of 
individuals, including convicted felons. In the Voter Information Pamphlet prepared by 
the lieutenant governor's office, Sen. Jack M. Bangerter and Rep. Donna M. Dahl, 
sponsors of the amendment in the Senate and House, respectively, stated: 
The amendment specifically guarantees broad individual liberties 
and protects the enjoyment of those liberties from infringement. At the 
same time, the legislature may continue to enact laws against the misuse 
of arms and the police may continue to enforce such laws; enforcement 
would extend to seizing arms which are misused. 
An individual right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed. However, 
convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not 
be guaranteed this right. The principle of law that such persons may be 
excluded from the enjoyment of the right to keep and bear arms is well-
established 
Voter Information Pamphlet, dated November 6, 1984. R. 69-73 (emphases added). 
As noted by Sen. Bangerter and Rep. Dahl, excluding certain classes of 
individuals from the right to bear arms has a long historical pedigree. As originally 
conceived in the common law and understood by the Founding Fathers, the right to bear 
arms was limited to "law-abiding citizens." State v. Hirsch, 34 P.3d 1209, 1211 (Or. App. 
2001) (citing Stephen P. Halbrook, The Original Understanding of the Second 
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I 
Amendment, in The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current Understanding, 117, 
121 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed., 1991). As one historian noted: 
Felons simply did not fall within the benefits of the common 
law right to possess arms. That law punished felons with 
automatic forfeiture of all goods, usually accompanied by 
death. We may presume that persons confined in [jails] j 
awaiting trial on criminal charges were also debarred from the 
possession of arms. Nor does it seem that the Founders 
considered felons within the common law right to arms or 
intended to confer any such right upon them. All the ratifying 
convention proposals which most explicitly detailed the < 
recommended right-to-arms amendment excluded criminals 
and the violent 
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
I 
Amendment, 82 Mich. L Rev 204, 266 (1983);3 see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A 
Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn L Rev 461,480 (1995) ("[F]elons, 
children, and the insane were excluded from the right to arms precisely as (and for the ^ 
same reason) they were excluded from the franchise"); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 
Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ 1131, 1164 (1991) (right to bear arms, like right to 
vote, accrues to citizens, not all people). In sum, the right to bear arms has historically 
been denied to those who violate the law, thus proving themselves unworthy of the right. 
The wording of article I, § 6, both before and after the amendment, evinces an 
intent to adopt a limited right to bear arms, one that may be regulated by the Legislature. 
This view is also consistent with the interpretation of similar state constitutional j 
3
 Quoted in Hirsch, 34 P.3d at 1211. 
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provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. 
Blue, 544 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1975) ("To limit the possession of firearms by those who, 
by their past conduct, have demonstrated an unfitness to be entrusted with such dangerous 
instrumentalities, is clearly in the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare and 
within the scope of the Legislature's police power") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
Thus, the debates concerning the 1984 amendment to article I, § 6, as well as the 
historical development of similar provisions elsewhere, demonstrate that lawmakers 
realized the importance of restricting the use or possession of firearms by felons and that 
they acted purposefully to safeguard that prerogative. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
correctly rejected defendant's claim that the Utah Constitution granted him a right to 
possess a handgun. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the Court of Appeals' decision was 
incorrect. The Court of Appeals correctly relied on State v. In and properly held that the 
Utah Constitution does not protect the right of convicted felons to possess firearms. 
Alternatively, a review of the history of article I, § 6, as well as similar federal and state 
constitutional provisions in other jurisdictions, also shows conclusively that the Utah 
provision does not grant convicted felons the right to possess firearms. This Court should 
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of July, 2003. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF < 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General i 
i 
i 
i 
I 
i 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms J 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd 8.S.), Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
S.J.R. 3. this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), J 2. 
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76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon, 
firearm, or explosive — Persons not permitted to 
have — Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any explosive, chemical, 
or incendiary device as those terms are defined in Section 76-10-306 or 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-10-501. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or an explosive, chemical, 
or incendiary device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(via) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
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O . O ^ H w.j.i.yv-.r.rs of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 0 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
WADE LEON WILLIS, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 001403071 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed January 4, 2001, and his 
accompanying memorandum in support thereof The State filed an Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, and the Defendant filed a Response. 
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I of this prosecution on the grounds that U.C.A. § 76-
10-503(2)(a) violates Defendant's right to keep and bear arms pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of 
the Utah Constitution. This provision of the Utah Constitution reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of 
self) family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall 
not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the 
lawful use of arms. 
The Defendant argues that a portion of the statute under which Defendant was charged is at odds 
with this provision of the Utah Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional. Defendant was 
charged under U.C.A. § 76-10-503(2)(a), which reads: 
(2) Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony. 
Defendant maintains that the Utah Constitution has granted the legislature the power to regulate 
the use of firearms, but not the possession of firearms. Defendant asserts that this statute is 
unconstitutional because it prohibits the mere possession of a firearm, the crime with which 
Defendant was charged in Count I. 
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The recent case of State v. In 2000 UT App. 358, addresses the constitutionality of 
U.C A§ 76-10-503(2)(a) in light of Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. The Appellate 
Court noted that "[w]hen addressing [constitutional challenges], this court presumes that the 
statute is valid, and [resolves] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." IcL The court 
then concluded that the statute "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear 
arms. This statute only restricts that right under very limited circumstances—such as a felony 
indictment or conviction. Such restrictions are constitutional." Id (citations omitted). The court 
further cited State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1974), as holding that this statute is a 
proper exercise of State police powers. 
In light of this recent appellate decision, the Court holds that the restrictions contained in 
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a), including the restriction of mere possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, do not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms because the statute only 
restricts that right under very limited circumstances. Defendant's Motion is Dismiss is therefore 
denied. 
DATED this fc day of f t h . 2001, 
BYTHECOURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 001403071 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
By Hand STATE OF UTAH 
By Hand JARED ELDRIDGE 
Dated t h i s k? day of r<Lh 20 61 . 
Deputy Court Clerk \ 
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410 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 2000 UT App 358, U 
(Cite as: 18P.3d500) 
C 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Chamnap IN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 990710-CA. 
Dec. 14,2000. 
Defendant was convicted in the District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Sandra 
Peuler, J., of possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, and 
defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Davis, J., held that: (1) 
defendant was a "convicted" felon for 
purposes of statute prohibiting a person 
convicted of a felony offense or under an 
indictment from possessing a handgun; (2) 
"convicted" as used in statute means guilty 
by verdict or plea, rather than by judgment 
of conviction at sentencing; and (3) 
application of statute to defendant did not 
violate defendant's due process rights. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
UJ Criminal Law ^^1134(3) 
UOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Page 1 
14, 18P.3d500 
If the trial court's order is premised on 
statutory interpretation, the Court of 
Appeals affords the trial court's 
interpretation no deference and reviews for 
correctness. 
|21 Criminal Law «=»1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
A constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which the 
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness. 
[31 Constitutional Law ^ 4 8 ( 1 ) 
92k48(l) Most Cited Cases 
131 Constitutional Law ^ 4 8 ( 3 ) 
92k48f3) Most Cited Cases 
When addressing a constitutional 
challenge to a statute, the Court of Appeals 
presumes that the statute is valid, and the 
Court resolves any reasonable doubts in 
favor of constitutionality. 
[41 Weapons €=^4 
406k4 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant was a "convicted" felon within 
meaning of statute prohibiting a person 
convicted of a felony offense or under an 
indictment from possessing a handgun, 
though defendant had pled guilty to a prior 
felony but had not been sentenced on prior 
felony at time of his subsequent offense; if 
defendant was found innocent after 
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indictment, or the guilty plea or verdict 
was set aside or overturned, he would no 
longer be a restricted person, however, at 
time of plea, defendant was restricted 
based upon that conviction resulting from 
the plea or verdict. U.C. A. 1953. 
76-lQ-303(3)(tyfl f 1999Y 
IS Statutes ^ 2 0 8 
361k208 Most Cited Cases 
It is a fundamental principle of statutory 
construction that the meaning of a word 
cannot be determined in isolation, but must 
be drawn from the context in which it is 
used. 
|<Q Weapons ^^4 
406k4 Most Cited Cases 
"Convicted," as used in statute prohibiting 
a person convicted of a felony offense or 
under an indictment from possessing a 
handgun, means guilty by verdict or plea, 
rather than by judgment of conviction at 
s e n t e n c i n g . U . C . A . 1 9 5 3 . 
76-10-503r3yayiU1999Y 
|7J Sentencing and Punishment €^30 
350Hk30 Most Cited Cases 
A guilty defendant who is considered 
worthy of a reduced sentence should 
receive all the advantages that go with 
such leniency. 
[81 Constitutional Law ^258(3.1) 
92k258f3.n Most Cited Cases 
181 Weapons ^ ^ 4 
406k4 Most Cjted.Cases 
Page 2 
Application of statute prohibiting person 
convicted of a felony or under an * 
indictment from possessing a handgun to 
defendant did not violate defendant's due 
process rights; definition of "convicted" 
was sufficiently explicit to inform ordinary 
reader what conduct was prohibited, 
statute was narrowly constructed, there 
was no assertion that others had been 
treated differently, it did not vest unlimited 
enforcement discretion in anyone, and ' 
statute only restricted one's right to bear 
arms under very limited circumstances. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend 14: Const. Art. K 
§ 6: U.C.A. 1953. 76-10- 503(3)(a)(i) 
(1999). , 
£91 Criminal Law 0*13.1(1) 
110kl3.im Most Cited Cases 
The failure to define a statutory term is not < 
necessarily fatal to a statute. 
[101 Criminal Law 0^13.1(1) 
110kl3,l( 1) Most Cited Cases 
' . • ' - ' • ( 
A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if 
it is sufficiently explicit to inform the 
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited 
and does so in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory { 
enforcement. 
*501 Linda M. Jones. Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
JM-Graham, Attorney General and Kris 
f! Leonard. Assistant Attorney General, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
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Before Judges JACKSON, DAVIS, and 
ORME. 
OPINION 
DAVIS. Judge: 
% 1 Defendant Chamnap In appeals from 
his judgment of conviction for possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-503f3yaYfl (Siipp.l997Y fFNl] 
Defendant argues that he was not a 
"restricted person" as defined in section 
76-10- S03f3XaXi) because, although he 
had pleaded guilty to a prior felony at the 
time of this offense, he had not been 
sentenced on that prior felony, and thus, he 
had not yet "been convicted of any felony 
offense." See id. Defendant further 
contends that if his first argument fails, his 
due process rights were violated because 
the statute fails to give adequate notice, it 
is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and 
it interferes with his right to bear arms. 
We affirm. 
FN1. This statute has since been 
amended. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-503 fSupp.2000Y Although 
those amendments are not material 
to the analysis of this case, we rely 
on the version of the statute which 
was in effect in January 1998 when 
defendant committed the offense. 
BACKGROUND 
1f 2 Defendant, a member of the Tiny 
Oriental Posse gang, was involved in the 
drive-by shooting of a member of the 
Oriental Laotian Gangsters, a rival gang. 
Defendant pleaded guilty to discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Ut^ X^de..ADB.:..^  
76-10-508 fSupp. 1997V on January 23, 
1998. Sentencing on that offense was set 
for August 7, 1998. One week later, on 
January 30,1998, defendant was involved 
in another shootout. Pursuant to an 
investigation of that shootout, defendant 
admitted he was in possession of a 
handgun, and was subsequently charged 
with possession of a dangerous weapon by 
a restricted person, in violation of Utah 
Cgcfc A f t § 76-|0-503(3)(a)fl) 
fSttpp.!997>, Defendant's status as a 
restricted person was based solely on his 
prior guilty plea to a third degree felony. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
L1JI2J13] % 3 Defendant asks us to address 
the following narrow issue: In the context 
of Utah Code Ann. $ 76-10-503(3 ){a)(i). is 
one "convicted" who has pleaded guilty, or 
been found guilty by a trier of fact but has 
not yet been sentenced and a judgment of 
conviction has not yet been entered? " '[I]f 
the trial court's order is premised on 
statutory interpretation, as it is here, we 
afford the trial court's interpretation no 
deference and review for correctness.' " 
State v. Dominguez. 1999 UT App 343. <|[ 
6. 992 P.2d 995 (citation omitted). 
Defendant contends, in the alternative, if 
we hold he is a restricted person under 
section 76-10- 503(3XaXi)« then a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
subsequent conviction under section 
Te-lO-SOS^XaVi^  violates his due process 
rights because the statute fails to give 
adequate notice, is susceptible to arbitrary 
enforcement, and interferes with one's 
right to bear arms. [FN2] "A 
constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which we 
review for correctness." State v. Lopes, 
1999 UT 24 J 6. 980 P.2d 191. "When 
addressing such a challenge, this court 
presumes that the statute is valid, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality." /# 
FN2. Defendant's attorney stated in 
oral argument that he was not 
challenging the statute on its face. 
ANALYSIS 
L4] 14 Utah Code Ann, (f 76-10-503(3Ma) 
(Supp.1997) states in pertinent part, "A 
person may not... possess... any handgun 
... who: (i) has been convicted of any 
felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, *502 this state, or any other 
state; [or] (ii) is under indictment..." Id. 
In this case, defendant disputes the trial 
court's interpretation of the meaning of 
"convicted." "Previous cases have 
acknowledged that in the legal context, 
there are two common meanings for 
'conviction': one which denotes the 
establishment of 'guilt by verdict or plea' 
and one which refers to 'the final judgment 
entered on the plea or verdict.' " State v. 
Hunt. 906 P.2d 311. 313 (Utah 1995) 
(quoting State v. Duncan 812 P.2d 60, 62 
Page 4 
(Utah Ct.App. 1991\); cf. Stare v. Eweil. 
883 P.2d 1360. l3a(UttkCU^A^) 
(holding that definition of "conviction" in 
context of Utah Code Ana j ,76-3-2()3i4) 
(1990) firearms enhancement does not 
include sentencing). 
[5] f 5 The determination of which 
definition controls turns on " 'the context 
and the purpose within which the term 
"conviction" is used/ " Hunt. 906 P. 2d at 
313 (quoting Duncan. 812 P.2d at 62). 
"Indeed, it is a 'fundamental principle of 
statutory construction ... that the meaning 
of a word cannot be determined in 
isolation, but must be drawn from the 
context in which it is used .' " /# (quoting 
Dealv. United States. 508 U.S. 129, 131 
113 S.Ct. 1993. 1996, 124 L.EA2d 44 
(1993)). 
[6] H 6 With respect to section 
76-10-503(3Xa)« the context and purpose 
within which the term "convicted" is used 
indicate that the proper meaning here is 
guilt by verdict or plea rather than by 
judgment of conviction at sentencing. 
The purpose of such a law is to restrict 
access of weapons to those who could be 
dangerous to society. The statute restricts 
access to handguns not only to convicted 
felons, but also to people under 
indictment. It would be illogical to restrict 
a person from possessing a handgun who 
has merely been accused of committing a 
crime and is under indictment, but then 
allow that person to turn around and 
possess a handgun upon a plea or verdict 
of guilt pending sentencing. {FN3J 
Indeed, the thrust of this statute is to 
restrict one's possession of a handgun upon 
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an indication that one may be a danger to 
society. See Utah Code Ann. $ 
76-10-503m fSupp. 1997V Thus, the 
context and purpose of this statute indicate 
that convicted refers to a plea or verdict of 
guilt, and not to a judgment of conviction. 
FN3. Even if one were later 
allowed to withdraw his or her plea, 
or the court entered the conviction 
for a lower category of offense, one 
could still be guilty of possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person. Such a finding is 
consistent with the legislative 
intent, just as one could violate this 
statute while under indictment even 
if he or she was later found not 
guilty. 
1f 7 This holding is also consistent with the 
analysis in Stare v. Hunt. 906 P,2d 311 
(Utah 1995V in which the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the meaning of conviction 
in the context of a sentencing enhancement 
statute referred to "the determination of 
guilt by verdict or plea rather than by 
judgment of conviction." Id. at 313. The 
supreme court reasoned that if conviction 
referred to judgment of conviction then "a 
defendant could commit an offense, be 
charged for that offense, and commit 
another offense while the charges were 
pending without being subject to the 
enhancement provision." M. Likewise, 
defendant committed a crime with a 
handgun, after pleading guilty to a felony, 
while sentencing and judgment were 
pending on that felony. Such a situation 
Page5 
is consistent with the language of the 
statute, and "[w]e decline to inject ... an 
amendment into the otherwise plain 
language of the statute." M 
f 8 In Stare v. BwelL 883 P.2d 1360 (Utah 
CtApp. 1993V this court examined a 
firearm enhancement statute, UtaLCojIe 
Ann. § 76-3-203^ ri990V which 
distinguished the terms "sentenced" from 
"convicted," and held that sentencing must 
precede the second felony conviction in 
order to impose the enhancement. See Id, 
at 1363. That holding is consistent with 
our holding here because the language at 
issue in Ewell supports the proposition that 
the Legislature is well aware of the 
difference between "convicted" and 
"sentenced." See id. at 1364-65 (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
[21K 9 Finally, State v. Duncan. 812P.2d 
60 (Utah CtApp. 1991V addressed whether 
a witness could be impeached for a felony 
plea which was reduced to a misdemeanor 
at sentencing. In Duncan^ we held that 
the witness could not be impeached for the 
felony, once he had been sentenced to the 
misdemeanor. See id ,at 64, This 
holding is not *503 inconsistent with our 
holding here. "A guilty defendant who is 
considered worthy of a reduced sentence 
should receive all the advantages that go 
with such leniency." hi at 64. Likewise, 
here, if a defendant was found innocent 
after indictment, or the guilty plea or 
verdict was set aside or overturned, he 
would no longer be a restricted person. 
However, at the time of the plea, the 
defendant would be restricted based upon 
that conviction resulting from the plea or 
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verdict. 
il 10 Thus, in the context of possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
see Utah Code Aim. $ 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) 
(Supp.1997), the term "convicted" refers 
either to the entry of a guilty plea or to a 
guiltyverdict, and does not refer to the 
later entry of judgment on the conviction. 
[8] if 11 Next, defendant argues that his 
due process rights were violated because 
the statute fails to give adequate notice, is 
susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and 
interferes with one's right to bear arms. 
We disagree. 
|9)[1Q] f 12 First, section 
76-lQ«503(3Xftyi) gives adequate notice. 
"[T]he failure to define a statutory term is 
not necessarily fatal to a statute." State v. 
Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305. j[ 10. 989 
P.2d503: see also State v. Krueger. 1999 
UT App 054. J 23. 975 P.2d 489. cert 
granted, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999) 
(noting adequate notice of prohibited 
conduct even when statute failed to define 
term "delinquent"); State v. (Mens. 638 
P.2d 118X1185 (Utah 198tt (upholding 
constitutionality of statute when term 
"gross deviation" was not defined); Salt 
Lake Citv v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259. 1265 
OJtah CtApp. 19971 (holding failure to 
define "emotional distress" in statute "does 
not render the statute unconstitutionally 
vague"). "[A] statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently 
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what 
conduct is prohibited and does so in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement." 
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Krueger 1999 [JT App 054 at J23, 975 
P.2d 489; see also Greeimood v. City of 
K Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 
1991V Here, the definition of "convicted" 
"is sufficiently explicit to inform the 
ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited." Krueger, 1999 UT App 054 
at If 23.975P.2d489. In common usage, 
the verb "convict" means "to find or prove 
to be guilty." Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary 287 (1986); see also 
Black's Law Dictionary 335 (7th ed. 1999) 
("To find (a person) guilty of a criminal 
offense either upon a criminal trial, a plea 
of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere (no 
contest).") In addition, the statute 
prohibits a person under indictment from 
possessing a handgun. It would be 
unreasonable for a person to interpret the 
term "convicted" under its technical 
definition of the actual entry of judgment 
of conviction, as opposed to its more 
common meaning of a finding or proving 
of guilt, especially in light of the 
prohibition against possessing a handgun 
when indicted, which is a mere accusation 
of a crime. 
f 13 Second, this statute is not susceptible 
to arbitrary enforcement. The statute is 
narrowly constructed and there is no 
assertion that others have been treated 
differently in the application of this statute. 
In addition, the statute does not vest 
unlimited enforcement discretion in 
anyone. 
i| 14 Finally, this statute does not 
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right 
to bear arms. Tliis statute only restricts 
that riglrt tm 
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circumstances-such as a felony indictment 
or coiwictMML ifeg C^ tah Code Ann. .$ 
76-10^03ftttM fSiif».I997>. Such 
reactions are constitutional SeeVt^h 
Const, art. L S 6 ("nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the 
lawful use of aims"); ^  State v... Beorvhja^ 
530 P.2d 813. 815 (Utah 19741 (holding 
that this section is a proper exercise of 
State police powers). 
CONCLUSION 
115 The trial court did not err in finding 
defendant a "restricted person" as defined 
in section 76-10-503(3 )('d)(i) based upon 
his prior felony plea of guilty at the time of 
this offense. In addition, defendant's due 
process rights were not violated. The 
statute gives adequate notice, is not 
susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and 
does not unconstitutionally interfere with 
defendant's right to bear arms. We affirm. 
*504 1f 16 I CONCUR: JACKSON. 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
1 17 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
GREGORY K.ORME. Judge. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wade WILLIS, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20010495-CA. 
July 5, 2002. 
Defendant was convicted in Fourth 
District Court, Provo Department, Gary D. 
Stott, J., of possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Jackson, P. J., held that 
Weapons Restriction Statute was not 
unconstitutional. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Ul Criminal Law °^1134(3) 
110kll34(3) Most Cited Cases 
A constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. 
[21 Constitutional Law ^48(1) 
92k48(n Most Cited Cases 
121 Constitutional Law ^48(3) 
92k48m Most Cited Cases 
When addressing a constitutional 
challenge to a statute, the reviewing court 
presumes that the statute is valid, and 
resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality. 
[31 Weapons °^1 
406kl Most Cited Cases 
[3] Weapons *^4 
406k4 Most Cited Cases 
Weapons Restrictions Statute that 
prohibited defendant from possessing a 
firearm was a valid exercise of State police 
power and did not violate Second 
Amendment, where statute restricted the 
right under very limited circumstances 
such as felony indictment or conviction. 
U.&CA CongtAmgnj 2; Const, Art.. 1, 
16; U.C.A. 1953. 76-10-503(2 Ha). 
*461 Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, for 
Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brett J. DelPorto, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges JACKSON. DAVIS, and 
THORNE. 
OPINION 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
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11 1 Defendant appeals his conviction 
subsequent to a conditional guilty plea to 
possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a second-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. & 
76-10-3031^ fSuppJOOtt (Weapons 
Restrictions Statute). [FN1] We affirm. 
FNL This section provides, in 
pertinent part, "[a] Category I 
restricted person who purchases, 
transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: (a) 
any firearm is guilty of a second 
degree felony." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-503f2Va;> (SuppJOOl). 
[ l p ] 112 Defendant challenges the statute 
under which he was convicted as being 
unconstitutional on its face. " 'A 
constitutional challenge to a statute 
presents a question of law, which we 
review for correctness.... When addressing 
such a challenge, *462 this court presumes 
that the statute is valid, and we resolve any 
reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.'" Slate v. Morrison 2001 
UT 73tf 5, 31 P.34 547 (Utah 2001) 
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. 
Lopes. 1999 UT 24* 6. 980 P,2d 191). 
ANALYSIS 
[3j 1f 3 State v. In 2000 UT App 358. 18 
P.3d 500. is controlling. In that case we 
stated that the Weapons Restrictions 
Statute 
does not unconstitutionally interfere with 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim 
one's right to bear arms. This statute 
only restricts that right under very 
limited circumstances-such as a felony 
indictment or conviction. Such 
restrictions are constitutional. SeeUMl 
Const, art L § 6 ...;[ [FN2]] Stale v. 
BeorchicL S3Q P.2d 813,815 (Utah 1974) 
(holding that this section is a proper
 { 
exercise of State police powers). 
FN2. Utah Const, art. I § 6 
provides: "The individual right of ( 
the people to keep and bear arms 
for security and defense of self, 
family, and others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but < 
nothing herein shall prevent the 
legislature from defining the lawful 
use of arms." 
Id at If 14. Defendant attempts to * 
distinguish the present case by arguing that 
In only addresses the constitutionality of 
the statute as it applies to use, as opposed 
to "mere possession of a firearm by a , 
restricted person." (Emphasis added.) 
However, our conclusion in In, a case in 
which the defendant was convicted of 
illegally possessing a firearm, simply 
stated that the restrictions contained in ^ 
"this statute do[ ] not unconstitutionally 
interfere with one's right to bear arms," 
and made no distinction between use and 
possession. M. Because [n made no 
distinction between use and possession, its 4 
conclusion that the Weapons Restrictions 
Statute is constitutional applies both to 
restrictions on possession and to 
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restrictions on use. [FN3| 
FN3. Moreover, we note that one 
may "use" a firearm by the mere act 
of possessing it—e.g., to deter 
unlawful behavior in "defense of 
self, family, and others" etc. Utah 
Const art.L § 6. By way of further 
illustration, we note that the United 
States, by mere possession of a 
nuclear arsenal, theoretically "uses" 
that arsenal to deter would-be 
aggressors from taking military 
action against it. We also note that 
Utah Const art. L § 6 makes no 
distinction between passive use and 
active use of a firearm. 
f 4 Accordingly, we reject Defendant's 
constitutional challenge to the Weapons 
Restrictions Statute and affirm his 
conviction for possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. 
U 5 Affirmed. 
H 6 We Concur: JAMES Z. DAVIS and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR.. Judges. 
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